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Abstract. In this paper we report our experiment concerning new attacks detection by a neural 
network-based Intrusion Detection System.  What is crucial for this topic is the adaptation of the 
neural network that is already in use to correct classification of a new “normal traffic” and of an 
attack representation not presented during the network training process. When it comes to the new 
attack it should also be easy to obtain vectors to test and to retrain the neural classifier. We 
describe the proposal of an algorithm and a distributed IDS architecture that could achieve the 
goals mentioned above.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Because of their generalization feature, neural networks are able to work with imprecise and 
incomplete data. It means that they can recognize also patterns not presented during a 
network learning phase. That’s why neural networks could be a good solution for detection 
of a well-known attack, which has been modified by an aggressor in order to pass through a 
firewall system. In that case, traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), based on the 
signatures of attacks or expert rules, may not be able to detect such a new version of this 
attack.  
Unfortunately, as it could be noticed in [1] and in the results of our research (Table 2) 
some representation of the new attack or the normal traffic not presented during the training 
process cannot be properly classified by the neural network. A remedy could be adding a 
vector representing new traffic to the learning data set and to retrain the neural network. 
However, the blocking problem for such an approach is to obtain data that represent new 
previously not detected attacks. We presented in this paper a proposal of an algorithm and an 
IDS architecture that allow to collect automatically new attacks-representing data and to use 
them for retraining and updating weights and the number of hidden neurons in a distributed 
network detectors based on the neural network technology.  
 In our research we focus on MLP and SVM neural networks architectures. The result of 
the investigation is the information about the classification accuracy, represented as a number 
of false alarms and not detected attacks in comparison to the number of validation vectors. A 
new attack and a new normal traffic representation are added to the training data set in order 
to observe their influence on improvement of the classification process for new vectors in the 
tests data set.  
 
 
 
2. Neural Network: a way of work  
 
An artificial neural network is a system simulating the work of neurons in the human 
brain. In Fig.1 is shown a diagram of a neuron’s operation.   
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Fig. 1 Artificial neuron’s schema  
 
The neuron consists of a number of inputs emulating dendrites of the biological neuron, an 
adder module, an activation function and one output emulating an axon of the biological 
neuron. The importance of a particular input is indicated by its weight that emulates the 
biological neuron’s synapse. The input signals are multiplied by the values of weights and 
next the results are added in the adder block.  The sum is sent to the activation block where it 
is processed by the activation function. In that way we obtain the neuron’s answer Y for the 
input signals “xi”. 
One neuron cannot solve a complex problem that’s why the neural network composed of 
many neurons is used. For the purpose of this work two network architectures were used: 
SVM and MLP. 
 One of the architectures that is used most frequently is the MLP (Multilayer Perceptron) 
[2], [3]. In such a network each neuron’s output of the previous layer is connected with some 
neuron’s input of the next layer. The MLP architecture consists of one or more hidden layers. 
The signal is transmitted through the network in one direction from the input to the output, 
that’s why this architecture is called feedforward. The MLP network is learned with using the 
backward propagation algorithm (BP). In order to reach better efficiency and speed of the 
learning process it uses many types of the BP algorithm. In our research we used following 
variants of the BP algorithm:  
 
¾ Levenberg-Marquardt (trainln), 
¾ Resilient Backpropagation (trainrp). 
 
For the simulation process Matlab toolbox was used. The variants of the BP algorithm are 
followed by the name of the learning Matlab’s function in brackets. 
 
The second neural network architecture that was applied for our experiment is SVM 
(Support Vector Machine). It is the feedforward neural network that consists of two layers 
(hidden and output) and can use various types of the activation function. In the classification 
tasks, the first step of the SVM network work is to transform the nonlinearly separated input 
observations (with usage of a kernel function) to the space where they can be lineally 
separated. The second step of the learning phase is the maximization of the separation margin 
between two classes of the observations. In the simulation LibSVM implementation of the 
SVM network was used.  
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3. Input data for attacks detection 
 
     In the first phase of our investigation we used the KDD 99 data set as the input vectors for 
training and validation of the neural networks. This data set was prepared based on the data 
collected in the DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) intrusion detection 
evaluation program. MIT Lincoln Lab that participates in this program has set up simulation 
of typical LAN network in order to acquire raw TCP dump data [4]. They simulated LAN 
network operating as a normal environment, which was infected with various types of 
attacks. The raw data was processed into connection records [5], [6]. For each connection 41 
various features were extracted. Each connection was labeled as the normal one or under a 
specific type of attack. Four main categories of the attacks were simulated:  
 
 DoS (Denial of Service) – An attacker tries to prevent legitimate users from using a 
service, e.g. TCP SYN Flood, Smurf, etc. 
 Probe – An attacker tries to collect information about the target host. For example: 
scanning victims in order to get knowledge of available services, operating system 
version etc.   
 U2R (User to Root) – An attacker has a local account on the victim host and tries to 
gain root privileges.  
 R2L (Remote to Local) – An attacker does not have local account on a victim host 
and tries to obtain it.   
 
The KDD 99 data set is divided in to tree subsets: 10%KDD, corrected KDD, whole KDD. 
Basic characteristics of the KDD99 data sets are shown in Table 3. The Table 3 includes the 
number of connections assigned to the particular class of an attack (DoS, Probe etc.).   
 
Table 1. KDD 99 data subsets 
 
Dataset DoS Probe U2r U2l Normal 
10%KDD 391458 4107 52 1126 97277 
Corrected 
KDD 229853 4166 70 16347 60593 
Whole KDD 3883370 41102 52 1126 972780 
 
The 10%KDD data set is used for the training process of the IDS. It includes connections 
simulating 22 types of attacks and the normal traffic. The Corrected KDD data set is used for 
the testing process of the IDS. It includes additional 14 types of new attacks not presented in 
10%KDD and in Whole KDD. Thanks to them it is possible to check if the IDS is able to 
detect a new attack not presented in the training phase.   
 
In the second phase of investigation we added to the KDD 99 data set the simulation 
results of 14 new attacks (generated with usage of Metasploit Framework) and a new normal 
traffic (instant messaging, VoIP, audio streaming, network games). These types of the 
network traffic were not presented before in the KDD 99 data set and could show how our 
proposal works for the real data.  
 
 4
 
 
 
 
4. Proposal of the IDS architecture  
 
The main goal of the IDS architecture proposed in this work is to allow adapting the IDS 
system to correct classification of a new network traffic related to both: the normal behavior 
of the end user and to the attacks. The block diagram of the architecture is presented in Fig. 
2.  
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Fig.2 Block diagram architecture of the IDS proposal 
  
The IDS system proposed in Fig. 2 is composed of three main modules: H&N monitor, Net- 
LAN monitor and Central module. The role of each module is the  following:  
 
H&N monitor 
Main task of this module is analyzing logs and host’s audit data in order to find an anomaly 
event that can be an aggressor’s activity.  When an attack is detected by Audit detector, the 
network packet associated with it should be identified. Based on that network data, the 
KDD99 vector of the attack detected is created and is delivered with the alarm flag to Central 
module where it could be used to retrain Base classifier.  
 
Net-LAN monitor 
This module analyses network data provided by a sniffer and transforms it to the KDD99 
vector form. The neural network is used for the classification process. It takes a decision 
whether a current vector is related to an attack or to a normal traffic. In a case of the attack 
detection, the alarm flag accompanied by the KDD99 vector is sent to Central module. 
Basing on this KDD99 vector it is possible to perform additional analysis and, finally, an 
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eventual decision about classification of this alarm to the attack group or to the false alarm 
group is taken. For the additional analysis purpose Central module can use various methods 
(in the simplest way, by analysis of a security officer). In a case of the false alarm, the 
provided KDD99 vector can be used to retrain Base classifier and to update all classifiers in 
all Net-LAN monitor modules.  
 
Central module 
 
This module obtains all alarms from distributed Net-LAN and H&N monitor modules and 
presents them to the end user of the IDS system. The second task of this module is retraining 
Base classifier with using the new learning data provided by H&N and Net-LAN monitors. 
Base classifier is the neural network that has the same architecture and weights values as 
Net-classifier in each Net-Lan monitor module. After the retraining process information 
about the updated weighs and the new number of hidden neurons is sent to all Net-LAN 
monitor modules. 
 
. An example of the network architecture that can use our solution is shown in Fig. 3. 
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Fig.3 The network architecture with the IDS proposal 
 
 
   In our work we decided that H&N monitor module is located on a honeypot system. This 
localization has the following advantages: 
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• For the honeypot system can be created specific security rules that are less restrictive 
than the rules for other hosts in the protected network.  In that case the host with the 
installed honeypot system can be visible for an aggressor as an easier target to attack 
than other hosts. Thanks to this feature it is more probable than for a real production 
server or for an end user host that the aggressor performs a new attack against it. As a 
result we can collect the data that represent this new attack. Moreover, focusing an 
aggressor’s attention on the honeypot could distract him from production servers and 
could increase other hosts safety. 
•  The honeypot system only simulates some network services and the size of the 
normal traffic destined for it is very limited. That’s why it is easier to identify the 
data related to the new attacks.  
 
The honeypot system in our proposal is located in the DMZ (Demilitarized zone). Thanks 
to this localization in a case of taking over the honeypot control by an aggressor, the risk of a 
successful attack against other host located in this internal network is lower because they are 
protected by specific rules of a firewall. Moreover, the DMZ is less secure so it could attract 
aggressors and make it easier to collect the data related to the new attacks.   
 
In order to analyze all network traffic data, Net-LAN monitor should be located in each 
real or virtual subnetwork.   
 
 
5. Results of tests 
 
Our investigation was divided in two phases. In the fist phase the accuracy of 
classification of a new pattern by the neural network was analyzed. The goal of the second 
phase was to build the prototype of the IDS in the proposed architecture and to check its 
effectiveness concerning detection of the new attacks and the normal traffic classification. 
The data sets used for each phase of investigation have been described in Chapter 3.  
 
Phase 1: 
 
For the simulation we used two architectures of the neural network: MLP and SVM. For 
the training and validation the KDD 99 data sets were used. More information about creation 
and training the neural network can be found in [7].  
During analysis of the tests results we noticed that both neural networks architectures 
have a problem with classification of a new attack not presented in the learning phase.  
 
• For the MLP network the detection rate of a new attack was only 4.26% while for the 
other attacks presented during the learning phase it was 98 %. The false alarm rate 
was 2.5%.  
•  For the SVM network the detection rate of a new attack was only 18.7% while for 
the other attacks presented during the learning phase it was 97 %. The false alarm rate 
was 2%.  
 
 In Table 2 the accuracy of detection for each type of the new attacks from the test data 
set was presented. It could be noticed that for 17 new attacks only 2 were classified with the 
detection rate that equals 100%.  
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Table 2. The accuracy of new attacks detection from Corrected KDD testing data set  
 
Name of attack Number of vectors in test data set 
Attack detection rate 
[%] (SVM) 
False alarm rate  
 [%] (MLP) 
Snmpgetattack  7741 0.25  0.02 
Named 17  29.4 52.94 
Xlock 9  0 55.55 
Xsnoop 4  50  50 
Sendmail 17  47.06 52.95 
Saint 736  96.06  82.2 
Xterm 13 84.61  61.54 
Mscan 1053  94.59  7.50 
Processtable 759  77. 08  1.45 
Ps 16  37.5  81.25 
Apache2 794  99.75  4.16 
Udpstorm 2 50  100 
Httptunnel 158 16.45  0.63 
Worm 2  0  0 
Mailbomb 5000  6.78  0.32 
Sqlattack 2  100  100 
Snmpguess 2406  0.17  0.04 
Sum of new attacks 18729  18.7  4.26 
 
 
Phase 2: 
 
As we noticed in the first phase, the SVM network better classified a new pattern. That’s 
why for the second phase of the investigation we decided to use only this neural network’s 
architecture. The results of the tests are presented in Table 3 (new normal traffic) and Table 4 
(new attacks). The first row of each table corresponds to the situation when the new normal 
traffic and the new attacks were not presented in the learning phase. In that situation for 
Table 3, false alarms were observed for 4 from 10 new normal vectors analyzed by Net-LAN 
monitor module. For Table 4 it could be noticed that 4 new attacks were not detected. The 
new attacks not detected by Net-LAN monitor were later detected by H&N monitor located 
on the honeypot hosts. Thanks to it we obtain the vectors for retraining the neural networks 
in Central module and for updating Net-LAN monitor classifiers. The second row of each 
table represents situation after this update. In both tables we observe that all the new vectors 
were properly classified.   
 
 
Table 3. The results of Net-LAN monitor classification of the new normal traffic 
  
Learning data set 
(network 
architecture) 
Test data set 
Number of 
false 
alarms 
Number of 
not 
detected 
attacks 
Remarks 
„NaukaIbiza2009sm 
(SVM)” 
„Testowe_gadu3D
” 1347 
21380 
 
 
Falsive alarm concerns: 
„sip-audio”,” rtp-
audio”, „ gadu-k”, 
„radio” 
„NaukaDay55” „Testowe_gadu3D” 1328 21432 
All the new normal 
vectors were properly 
classified 
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Table 4.  The results of detection of the new attacks by Net-LAN monitor 
 
Learning data set 
(network 
architecture) 
Test data set Number of false alarms 
Number of 
not detected 
attacks 
Remarks 
„NaukaIbiza2009sm
” 
(SVM) 
„Testowe+new31” 1343  21384 
Not detected: 
cesarftp_mkd, 
slimp_ftp_list., 
mailcarrier_smtp, 
goodtech_telnet 
net-klasyfikator after 
update (SVM) „Testowe+new31” 1376 21292 
all new attacks 
were properly 
detected 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 From our investigation we noticed that the neural networks properly classified the 
network traffic similar to the one presented during the learning phase. That’s why they could 
be a good solution for detection of the attacks that were modified by an aggressor in order to 
cheat intrusion detection systems. Unfortunately, the new attacks and the new normal traffic 
that is significantly different from the one presented in the training phase cannot be classified 
with sufficiently good accuracy. The IDS architecture that we proposed could improve 
classification of the new network patterns. Our solution has the following advantages:  
  
• It fixes problems with obtaining training data representing a new attack or a new 
normal traffic. 
• It adapts to new attacks detection. 
•  Thanks to using Net- LAN classifier it is possible to react on an attack in real time 
and block it before it reaches a host under protection. 
• It adapts the system to correct classification of the normal network traffic related to a 
new service not presented before in the training data (still it should be worked out a 
method of taking automatically final decision about classification of alarms in 
Central module). 
.   
 
It is important to check if adding a new vector influences negatively on the classification 
accuracy. For example in a situation when we add a new normal traffic to the learning data 
set and the number of not detected attacks increased significantly, the reason may be that the 
new vectors can be too much similar to an attack representation. In that case a new feature 
should be added to KDD99 vectors in order to classify reliably both traffic types. 
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